Strategy-proofness of social choice functions and non-negative association property with continuous preferences by Yasuhito Tanaka
Strategy−proofness of social choice functions and
non−negative association property with continuous
preferences 
Yasuhito Tanaka
Faculty of Law, Chuo University, Japan
Abstract
We consider the relation between strategy−proofness of resolute (single−valued) social
choice functions and its property which we call Non−negative association property (NNAP)
when individual preferences over infinite number of alternatives are continuous, and the set
of alternatives is a metric space. NNAP is a weaker version of Strong positive association
property (SPAP) of Muller and Satterthwaite(1977). Barbera and Peleg(1990) showed that
strategy−proofness of resolute social choice functions implies Modified strong positive
association property (MSPAP). But MSPAP is not equivalent to strategy−proofness. We shall
show that strategy−proofness and NNAP are equivalent for resolute social choice functions
with continuous preferences.
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We consider the relation between strategy-proofness of resolute (single-valued)
social choice functions (or voting rules) and its property which we call non-
negative association property (NNAP) when individual preferences over inﬁnite
number of alternatives are continuous, and the set of alternatives is a metric space.
NNAP is a weaker version of strong positive association property (SPAP) of
MullerandSatterthwaite(1977)1). BarberaandPeleg(1990)showedthatstrategy-
proofness of resolute social choice functions implies modiﬁed strong positive as-
sociation property (MSPAP). But MSPAP is not equivalent to strategy-proofness.
NNAP for social choice functions is the following condition:
Assume that for two distinct alternatives, x and y, there is an individ-
ual preference proﬁle u such that individuals in a group S prefer x to
y, individuals in a group S 0 are indierent between x and y, individ-
uals in a group S 00 prefer y to x and a social choice function chooses
x. Consider another proﬁle u0 such that individuals in S prefer x to
y, individuals in S 0 prefer x to y or their preferences are identical to
those at u, then the social choice function does not choose y at u0.
We shall show that strategy-proofness and NNAP are equivalent for resolute social
choice functions with continuous preferences. This result is an extension of the
works of Muller and Satterthwaite (1977), Barbera and Peleg (1990) and Tanaka
(2001)2).
2 Notations and deﬁnitions
Notations and terminologies are borrowed from Barbera and Peleg (1990). The
set of alternatives is denoted by A which is a metric space. The metric of A
is denoted by d. N = f1;2;:::;ng is the ﬁnite set of individuals with n = 2.
The individuals are indexed by individual i, j and so on, and the alternatives are
representedby x, y, zandsoon. Thepreferenceofindividualioverthealternatives
is represented by ui 2 U, where U is the set of continuous real-valued utility
1)Muller and Satterthwaite (1977) showed that strategy-proofness and strong positive associ-
ation property are equivalent for resolute social choice functions with unrestricted domain and
linear (strict) individual preferences.
2)In Tanaka (2001) we have shown that strategy-proofness is equivalent to generalized mono-
tonicity, which is similar to NNAP in this paper, for resolute social choice functions with unre-
stricted domain and general individual preferences which allow indierence.
1functions on A . A proﬁle of the individual preferences is denoted by a utility
proﬁle such as u = fu1  ;ung 2 UN, where UN is the set of all utility proﬁles for
N, and if u 2 UN and j 2 N then uj is the j-th component of u. ˆ u = u=u1
i denotes
the proﬁle where ˆ uj = uj for all j , i, and ˆ ui = u1
i.
A social choice function (or voting rule) is a function f : UN ) A . When
a social choice function chooses x at a proﬁle u, we denote f(u) = x. The range
of f is denoted by rf. We call the alternative which is chosen by a social choice
function the winner of the social choice function. We consider resolute social
choice functions which choose only one of the alternatives at every proﬁle, and
we assume that rf has at least three elements.
Suppose that at a utility proﬁle u a social choice function chooses x, and at
another proﬁle ˆ u = u=u1
i it chooses y. If u1
i(x) > u1
i(y) for individual i, the social
choice function is manipulable by him at ˆ u by ui because he can make the social
choice function choose x by misrepresenting a utility function ui when his true
utility function is u1
i. Similarly, if ui(y) > ui(x) for individual i, the social choice
function is manipulable by him at u by u1
i.
Strategy-proofness If a social choice function is not manipulable by any indi-
vidual at every utility proﬁle, it is strategy-proof.
Strongpositiveassociationproperty(SPAP)ofMullerandSatterthwaite(1977)
and modiﬁed strong positive association property (MSPAP) of Barbera and Peleg
(1990) are deﬁned as follows:.
Strong positive association property (SPAP) A social choice function satisﬁes
SPAP if for every u 2 UN, i 2 N, u1
i 2 U, if f(u) = x and [ui(x) = ui(y) )
u1
i(x) = u1
i(y), for all y 2 rf], then f(u=u1
i) = x.
Modiﬁed strong positive association property (MSPAP) A social choice func-
tion satisﬁes MSPAP if for every u 2 UN, i 2 N, u1
i 2 U, if f(u) = x and
[ui(x) = ui(y) and y , x ) u1
i(x) > u1
i(y), for all y 2 rf], then f(u=u1
i) = x.
SPAP is not necessarily satisﬁed by a strategy-proof social choice function. Bar-
bera and Peleg (1990) showed that strategy-proof social choice functions satisfy
MSPAP. But the converse does not hold as the following example shows.
An example Consider a society with two individuals 1 and 2, and there are four
alternatives x, y, z and w. We assume that at a utility proﬁle u, u1(x) = u1(y) =









2(z) and f(u0) = y,
and at all other proﬁles the social choice function chooses one of individual 1’s
most preferred alternatives. This social choice function does not violate MSPAP
because between u and u0 u2(z) < u2(x) is changed to u0
2(x) < u0
2(z), and between
u0 and u u0
2(w) < u0
2(y) is changed to u2(y) < u2(w). But it is manipulable by
individual 2 at u by u0
2, and also manipulable by him at u0 by u2.
Now we deﬁne non-negative association property (NNAP).
Non-negative association property (NNAP) Suppose that there is a utility pro-
ﬁle u 2 UN such that for alternatives x and y (x , y)
(1) individuals in a group S (S  N): ui(x) > ui(y)
(2) individuals in a group S 0 (S 0  N; S 0 \ S = ;): ui(x) = ui(y)
(3) others (group S 00): ui(y) > ui(x)
and a social choice function chooses x (f(u) = x). Let u0 2 UN be a proﬁle
such that
(1) individuals in S: u0
i(x) > u0
i(y)
(2) individuals in S 0: u0
i(x) > u0
i(y) or their utility functions do not change
(u0
i(x) = ui(x) for all x 2 A )
Then, the social choice function does not choose y at u0 (f(u0) , y).
3 Equivalence of NNAP and strategy-proofness
We show the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Non-negative association property (NNAP) and strategy-proofness
for social choice functions are equivalent.
We prove this theorem by two steps.
Step 1. Strategy proof social choice functions satisfy NNAP.
In the following proof we use notations in the above deﬁnition of NNAP. This
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Figure 2: Utility function vk(t) for individuals in S 00
Proof. Let individuals 1 to m (0  m  n) belong to S, individuals m + 1 to m0
(m  m0  n) belong to S 0, and individuals m0 + 1 to n belong to S 00.
(1) Let  be a positive real number, we deﬁne the neighborhoods of x and y by
B(x;) = fz 2 A jd(x;z) < g and B(y;) = fz 2 A jd(y;z) < g. Since A
is a metric space and the utility functions are continuous, we can make the
value of  be arbitrarily small such that B(x;) and B(y;) are disjoint, and
we have u0
i(x0) > u0
i(y0) for i 2 S [ S 0 and ui(y0) > ui(x0) for i 2 S 00 for
x0 2 B(x;); y0 2 B(y;).
For individuals in S and S 0 we deﬁne the following utility function3):
vj(t) =
d(t;A   B(x;))
d(t; x) + d(t;A   B(x;))
+
d(t;A   B(y;))
2[d(t;y) + d(t;A   B(y;))]
3)About those functions we are inspired by Barbera and Peleg (1990).
4And for individuals in S 00 we deﬁne the following utility function:
vk(t) =
d(t;A   B(x;))
2[d(t; x) + d(t;A   B(x;))]
+
d(t;A   B(y;))
d(t;y) + d(t;A   B(y;))
Theyarenon-negativeandcontinuous. Theseutilityfunctionsareillustrated
in Figure 1 and 2 in the one-dimensional case. Of course we do not assume
one dimensional space.
Let us consider a utility proﬁle v such that the utility functions of all indi-
viduals in S and S 0 (denoted by j) are vj, and the utility functions of all
individuals in S 00 (denoted by k) are vk.
Assuming that individual 1 belongs to S, let v1 be a utility proﬁle such that
only the utility function of individual 1 changes from u1 to v1, and sup-
pose that at v1 the social choice function chooses an alternative other than
x (f(v1) , x). Then, individual 1 has an incentive to report a false utility
function u1 when his true utility function is v1 because x is the maximal
element for v1, and hence we have f(v1) = x. By the same logic, when the
utility functions of individuals 1 to m0 change from uj to vj (denote such a
proﬁle by vm0
), we have f(vm0
) = x.
(2) Next, let vm0+1 be a utility proﬁle such that the utility function of individual
m0+1, aswellastheutilityfunctionsoftheﬁrstm0 individuals, changesfrom
um0+1 to vm0+1, and suppose f(vm0+1) 2 B(y;). Then, individual m0+1 has an
incentive to report a false utility function vm0+1 when his true utility function
is um0+1 because um0+1(y0) > um0+1(x0) for x0 2 B(x;); y0 2 B(y;). On the
other hand, if f(vm0+1) < B(x;)[ B(y;), individual m0 +1 has an incentive
to report a false utility function um0+1 when his true utility function is vm0+1
because vm0+1(x0) > vm0+1(z) = 0 for x0 2 B(x;) and z 2 fA   B(x;) [
B(y;)g. Therefore, we have f(vm0+1) 2 B(x;). By the same logic, when the
preferences of all individuals change from ui to vi, we have f(v) 2 B(x;).
(3) Now, suppose that the individual utility functions change one by one from vi
to u0
i. Then, when the utility function of some individual changes, the win-
ner of the social choice function can not change directly from x0 2 B(x;) to
y 2 B(y; 
2). If the social choice function chooses y 2 B(y; 
2) when the util-
ity function of an individual in S [S 0 (denoted by j) changes from vj to u0
j,
individual j has an incentive to report a false utility function vj when his true
utility function is u0
j because u0
j(x0) > u0
j(y) for x0 2 B(x;); y 2 B(y; 
2).
5On the other hand, if the social choice function chooses y 2 B(y; 
2) when
the utility function of an individual in S 00 (denoted by k) changes from vk
to u0
k, individual k has an incentive to report a false utility function u0
k when
his true utility function is vk because vk(y) > vk(x0) for x0 2 B(x;); y 2
B(y; 
2). Notice vk(y) > 1
2 and vk(x0) 5 1
2. See Figure 2.
(4) It remains the possibility, however, that the winner of the social choice func-
tion changes from x0 2 B(x;) through w 2 fA   B(x;) [ B(y; 
2)g to
y 2 B(y; 
2). Suppose that when the utility functions of some individu-
als have changed from vi to u0
i, the winner of the social choice function is
w 2 fA  B(x;)[B(y; 
2)g, and further when the utility function of individ-
ual l (l 2 S [ S 0 or l 2 S 00) changes from vl to u0
l, the winner of the social
choice function becomes y 2 B(y; 
2). Since vl(y) > vl(w) for y 2 B(y; 
2)
and w 2 fA   B(x;)[ B(y; 
2)g, he can get y by misrepresenting his utility
function u0
l when his true utility function is vl. Notice vj(y) > 1
4, vj(w) 5 1
4,
vk(y) > 1
2 and vk(w) 5 1
2. See Figure 1 and 2. Therefore, if the social
choice function is strategy-proof, in the sequence of changes of individual
utility functions the winner of the social choice function does not change
from x0 2 B(x;) through w 2 fA   B(x;) [ B(y; 
2)g to y 2 B(y; 
2), and
hence we must have f(u0) , y.
,
Next we show the converse of Step 1.
Step 2. NNAP for social choice functions implies strategy-proofness.
Proof. Let u be a proﬁle such that a social choice function chooses x (f(u) = x),
and assume that a social choice function which satisﬁes NNAP is manipulable.
Then, thereisacasewhere, whentheutilityfunctionofoneindividual(denotedby
i) changes from ui to, for example, u1
i (denote such a proﬁle by u=u1
i), the winner
of the social choice function changes from x to y and we have ui(y) > ui(x).
Comparing u and u=u1
i, individual i prefers y to x at u and the utility functions
of other individuals are the same. Thus, those who prefer x to y at u also prefer x
to y at u=u1
i, and the utility functions of individuals who are indierent between x
and y at u do not change from u to u=u1
i. From NNAP, if the social choice function
chooses x at u (f(u) = x), it does not choose y at u=u1
i (f(u=u1
i) , y). Therefore,
the social choice function must not be manipulable.
,
We have completed the proof of Theorem 1.
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